DEAN'S MESSAGE

2

STUDENTS SUPPLEMENT POVERTY PROGRAM

12

NIGERIAN LAW - FORCE UNIFICATION

3

TEAM RETURNS TO NEW YORK

13

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND
INMATE RIGHTS

7

DIGNITARIES ATTEND LEAHY DEDICATION

14

WARREN LAUDS PACEM AS SEMINAL

15

COMMAND INFLUENCE AND
MILITARY JUSTICE
OLD TO THE NEW

16

FALL and WINTER 1966

Page 2

DEAN'S MESSAGE
Nineteen sixty-six is the greatest year in this school's
history. We are in a new building and are greeting our biggest class of first year students. At the end of the year we
will graduate ninety lawyers, that will be our largest graduating class so far. It is an exciting year. Everything
about it colors this message to our new students.
We welcome you to the school, and we welcome you to
the legal profession. Already you have been in class for
two months. You know something about us. As I told you
during orientation, our students help to make us a great
school. Even as we grow larger, we are trying to preserve
the intimacy we knew in the days when we were small and
when we all lived closer together in an old building. By
any modern standards the Foster house was inadequate for
a law school, but it had charm and atmosphere. We are
fortunate that so many of us knew that old place, because
we have brought some of its character with us. We hope
it will rub off onto you. We expect you to discover that we
have a special kind of spirit in this student body which you
will absorb and perpetuate.
From the day you enter law school you are members
of our profession. We demand much from you, and we may
not always know how to reach you, but give us time, and
especially give us your time. Not every one of you will
practice law. Certainly not many of you will become great
judges, but all of you will be touched by the magic of the
law. Already you are not the same people you were before
you came to us.
It is not easy for men in the law to tell non-lawyers
what the profession means to its practitioners. Nor is it
always easy for lawyers to talk understandingly among
themselves abo ut the profession and its more profound implications. Often we are pedestrian and trite , but we know
how we feel, and we know that we share with our colleagues
something that impels us to be industrious and decent.
Eventually you will be admitted to practice before the supreme court in your state, and you will take an oath. Your
industry and decency can become wisdom and strength.
Your first year in law school will be difficult, but we
can help you over the rough spots. Even as we are growing, we are still not large . Our classes are small e nough
that our instructors know you. We want you to share your
study problems with us. The Student Bar Association is a
great society in this school. Its members are prepared to
help you adjust to your new environment. If your study problems seem to be bigger than you bargained for , consult your
colleagues and consult us. Because we have admitted you
to this school, we have not captured you for the profession.
You do not have to become l awyer s.
My final word is to te ll you we are glad you are here.
Most of you will remain with us. We are all colleagues
now. Remember that, while you work and learn with us.

Three law school alumni made possible the publication of the Spring 1966 Legal Issue through large last
minute contributions. Their generosity in m aking
these contributions is deeply appreciated by the Legal
Issue Staff. These men are Ralph H. Dwan, William
T. Hannon, and Joseph F. Castiello.
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NIGERIAN LAW - FORCE UNIFICATION
John B. Wefing

In recent months the independent country of Nigeria
has been torn with internal strife and disunity. Thousands
of persons from Eastern Nigeria were killed in Northern
Nigeria because of a drastic flareup of tribal hatred. Two
military coups in the last year have placed the country into
the hands of the military.
On October 30th the present leader of Nigeria, Military
Chief, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon announced that he was calling
a r e presentative assembly to adopt a constitution for the
divided republic. The basic religious, tribal, legal, economic and cultural differences among peoples in Nigeria
account for the inherent problems in formulating a unified
government. Formerly the Federation of Nigeria was composed of four fairly autonomous independent states. These
states had many differences both within themselves and
with each other. The uprisings in Nigeria today pe rhaps
highlight some of the difficulties resulting from the forced
imposition of a highly developed system of government upon
an undeveloped nation.
The development of the unique legal system or systems
in Nigeria today demonstrates the differences in t he various sections of Nigeria and their approaches to the problem
of unification.
Nigeria exemplifies pe rhaps better than any other African countr y the inte raction of the tribal , the Islamic and
the British legal systems. Prior to independence Nigeria
was a British colony. and the British, unlike the French
and other continental powers, allowed the customary law
to exist side by side with the legal system which they them selves set up. Therefore, it is in the ex- British colonies

that we find the most definitive study of the interaction between imported European laws and the various bodies of
customary tribal law in Africa.
In Northern Nigeria, where the Islamic law predominates, we can see first the interaction of customary tribal
law with the Islamic law and then the mingling of the amalgam with the British law.
The legal history of Nigeria may be divided into three
distinct periods -- pre-colonial, colonial, and post colonial.
During the pre-colonial period we see first the development
of the indigenous tribal system of law, and second, the interaction between these systems and the Islamic codes.
It is difficult or impossible to define adequately the
term "customary law. " Perhaps it is best to define it as
the laws of the various tribal groups in Africa prior to in fluence by exotic or external legal systems. It may also
be considered as the experiences of generations which have
proved workable and acceptable. The basic problem in defining customary law revolves around the differences in the
various tribal systems. Some are highly developed while
others are underdeveloped.
Despite wide variations in the legal and judicial struc ture s of the various tribal societies , still indigenous legal
institutions were evolving on a tribal or loc al basis with
reliance on the simple but important contributions of legislation by state, tribal or local authority.
Certain factors were common to all tribal law in that it
was unwritten, was usually limited to a rather small community, and was a direct expression of t he ideas and ideals
of the community. But the only real unity which can be
found in tribal law is in the spirit and approach which tribal groups use d in developing their own legal systems.

Peaceful Debate of Issues
Therefore, while we can delineate similarities in the
various indigenous tribal legal systems, it is prefe rable to
develop the spirit of the African law which permits a stu dent, as he "investigates a particular legal system, to state
' how typically African.'"
In the ideal situation the general atmosphere of the
African judicial process is "peaceful debate of the issue
dividing the litigants in the sure belief t hat some kind of
acceptable solution will be fouri d out of the e lder' s fund of
wisdom and sense of justice." This method was fully r eali zed only in certain nations and at particul ar periods. De spite the appeal of such a syste m it can be r ecognize d that
it is almost impossible to m ai~t ain in a mode rn society.
Nigeria was subject to these common characteristics
of the African legal s ystems. It was unwritten; it was vague;
it was a relatively simple system of soci al norms based on
the unit of the family, the village or the group of villages,
and there were many differences between the various tribal
groups in Nigeria. Three major tribal groups were dom inant in Nigeria - - the Ha usa in the North, the Ibo in the
East and the Yor uba in the West. Prior to the coming of
the British, Western Nigeria had empires, hier archies of
courts and widespread norms and customs of behaviour.
Eastern Nigeria had its own customs with the governmental
function be ing discharge d traditionally by Village Councils.
There were necessarily m any differences between these
tribal groups , but they did have an essential unity of spirit
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refused to examine the cases with reference to their own
law. Thus the dualism remained strong.
It was in this situation that reform was demanded. In
1958 a commission was set up to study this problem. Its
duty was to study other judicial systems where Moslem
and non-Moslem lived side by side, especially the systems
in Libya, Pakistan and Sudan, in order to consider what
system would be most applicable in Northern Nigeria.
The commission determined that there were three goals
which they hoped to achieve and which they considered to be
essential. Theywould haveto: l)preservehereditarylegal
rights according to Islamic law ; 2) assure minority groups
of maximum justice; and 3) add to the Northern Region's
stature abroad.
The commission determined on a number of proposals
which they submitted for discussion and eventual approval.
There were three main proposals. First, in the area of the
civil law it was suggested that the Maliki law be confined
to the personal and family law of Moslem litigants. Second,
an extensive reorganization of the court system was envisioned . And third, there was a proposal for the adoption
of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of
Sudan. This Code had already proved acceptable to many
million Muslims.in Sudan, Pakistan, Malaya and elsewhere,
and was easier to apply than the Nigerian Code.
These codes can validly be considered to be an amalgamation oflaws from the native laws and c ustoms , the Islamic law and the British law with even traces of the French
and Indian law added. Some people have argued that since
the new codes have been enacted the native law and custom
no longer have any influence. This is not strictly true because in certain instances the provisions of the codes are
taken from native law and authority.
These codes have been both praised and attacked. Attacks have centered on procedures which appear to limit
the individual's rights in certain respects -- allowance of
here say evidence, outmoded methods of cross-examination,
excess power in the hands of the police , and lack of legal
counsel. Praise has centered on the vast improvement of
this code over the rules formerly prevailing in the customary courts which handled 95% of the cases. To the person

trained in a English system of common law the new codes
may at first appear inadequate in protecting the individual,
but a comparison indicates the advance this code does represent over the criminal law in most African states. Thus ,
the general consensus has been favorable towards the new
codes.
The results of the acceptance of this Criminal Code
have been significant. For the first time there is not a dual
system of law in Northern Nigeria, at least in Criminal Law .
The new Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure
are applicable in both the "British" courts and the native
courts. But the dual system of criminal law in Northern
Nigeria has been eliminated only to create a dual system
of law between Northern Nigeria and the rest of the Federation of Nigeria. Conflict of law problems will still arise,
but now it is not a question of which court in Northern Ni geria will handle the case but rather whether the law of
Northern Nigeria or the law of the rest of Nigeria will be
applied. This is likely to add to the dissention between
Northern Nigeria and the rest of Nigeria already divided
by tribal , religious, economic and cultural differences .
But only time can determine whether this new criminal law
system will eventually aid in the development of national
unity as other regions in Nigeria recognize the positive
value of elim in ating the dual system of courts and come to
appreciate the merits of the Criminal Codes chosen by
Northern Nigeria or whether these codes will cause discontent and disunity.
Thus we see how the various tribal and religious dif ferences in Nigeria have shaped the law of that country.
We also see the problems and benefits caused by the imposition of the sophisticated British colonial system on the
underdeveloped legal system already existing in Nigeria.
Hopefully, the law of Nigeria will eventually fuse all these
elements together into a unified and uniquely Nigerian system of law which will aid in the unification of the entire
Federation .
The author acknowledges his debt to many helpful sources
but due to limitations of space and the nature of the article,
footnotes were eliminated.
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THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND
INMATE RIGHTS
Robert Warren

"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system." This principle, when enunciated by the United
states Supreme Courttwo decades ago in Price v. Johnson,
represented nothing new in the field of inmate rights. Rather, it was a blunt affirmation of the discretion granted prison
authorities to promulgate and enforce rules which, of neces sity, abridge the rights of inmates. This is not to say that
the Court condoned the abridgment of all rights of all in mates at all times. But it serves to aptly point up a manyfaceted problem which has plagued courts and penologists
since the inception of our prison system. What rights , if
any, are retained by those committed to lawful incarceration? When may these rights be contravened by prison
authorities in the administration of their duties? What
remedies are available to prisoners who claim unwarranted
infringement of these privileges? It would be impossible
in an article of this length to do justice to such a broad
field or even to mention all of the problems concerned.
But it is possible, and I believe especially topical, to focus
on a single, current aspect of this problem which may foreshadow a substantial judicial modification in the treatment
of inmate complaints. Should this be the case, much credit
for initiating the change will go to a most unlikely source,
the Black Muslim Brotherhood. Before turning to the more
precise issue of religious freedom raised by the Muslims ,
however, it will be necessary to briefly review the overall
question of inmate rights in order to better appreciate the
problems confronting not only the complaining prisoners
but the prison authorities and reviewing courts as well.

designed to regulate the conduct of prisoners in any reasonable manner. It mustbenoted,however,thatthis measure allows prison officials considerable discretionary latitude in the formulation and enforcement of these rules, and I
think that it is safe to say that "reasonable" is generally
not construed to be synonomous with the narrower term
'necessary'.
This brings us to the second consideration. How does
an individual prisoner obtain redress under a claim that
his rights have been "unreasonably" abridged? All too often the courts have allowed this question to go unanswered .
Despite the apparent merits of the reasonableness test, its
application is often hampered by the collateral doctrine of
judicial non-interference which has found favor in most
jurisdiction. This principle is but a reflection of the en during hesitancy of courts to interfere with that element of
penal discretion which is, by reference, incorporated in the
determination of what is reasonable and what is not. Literally hundreds of cases, state and federal, can be cited as
authority for strict application of this doctrine. A cursory
examination of the decisions show that the courts generally
begin with a statement as to the relative autonomy of penal
institutions and the discretion vested by legislators in prison officials to administer their duties as they see fit. Application of the principle is frequently characterized by a
denial of jurisdiction to hear the prisoner's complaint.

Rights Behind Bars
Basic to the entire problem is the determination of
what rights are retained by the individual prisoner during
incarceration. This area encompases not only freedom of
religion, which provides the foundation for current Muslim
litigation , but includes such fundamental rights as freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment, freedom of speech
and communication, the right to personal security, and
privileges relating to a prisoner's access to the courts.
The protection afforded by these and other fundamental
considerations of due process in a free society is not automatically withdrawn merely by pressing the status of an
inmate on the individual. On the other hand, it is obvious
that our penal system -- founded upon the restriction one
of the most basic of all rights, freedom of movement -cannot function properly without the imposition and implementation of myriad rules touching every aspect of the
individual's life in prison. As a result of judicial attempts
to cope with this conflict, the past fifty years have witnessed the slow, often haphazard evolution of the judge - made
test of "reasonable restrictions" as the key in resolving
conflicting demands of inmates and prison administrators.
stated in its simplest terms, the doctrine denies to
penal authorities a carte blanche to withdraw all inmate
rights but limits them to the promulgation of those rules

This is not to say that there haven't been exceptions
to the rule. In the past, courts have taken jurisdiction to
hear a complaint -- and to grant relief --where it appeared
that the petitioner had been subjected to unduly harsh or
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unreasonable treatment at the hands of prison authorities.
In a leading case, Coffin v. Reichard, the court refused to
sanction treatment of a prisoner who, upon revocation of
his probationary status, was returned to prison where he
was held incommunicado and coerced into making a confession concerning an incident which was alleged to have
occurred while he was on probation. At a hearing brought
on a writ of habeas corpus, the court went to some lengths
to express its dissatisfaction with prisoner abuses in general, holding: "A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law. While the law does take
his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and observance
of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners,
it does not deny his right to personal security against unlawful invasion."
The Coffin decision , however, represents, at best , a
minority point of view. Most courts -- barring action by
prison authorities so clearly inhum ane as to bring the prisoner's rights within the purview of the eighth am endment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment -- refuse to
interfere with the administration of inmate controls of either state or federal prison officials. Without indulging in
a detailed discussion of the cases and the fundame ntal con side r ations which support this policy of judic i al restraint ,
it can be s aid even in the c urrent climate of judicial awareness of the rights of the acc used at all levels of pre-trial,
trial and appellate proceedings, all too many jurisdictions
continue to refuse to take cognizance of the complaints of
petitioners asserting their rights as inmates following a
valid conviction.
Freedom of religion has long been marked by the Supreme Court as one of the "preferr ed freedoms" guaranteed
by the federal Constitution. But the judicia ry has also distinguishe d between the first amendment's protection of freedom of belief and the more limited safeguard afforded the
free exercise of one's beliefs. Whereas the former is absolute , overt religious practice has been considered in the
light of gener al public welfare and, where necessary, circumscribed. A 1957 NewJerseyc ase , McBride v . McCorkle, focused di rectly on the problem of religious fr ee dom
in prison. The court there stated: "The social interest
involved in de priving plaintiff of the opportunity to attend
Mass . . . can only be the preservation of order and discipline in the prison. If plaintiff has lost any right, it has
come about by his own hand. The interest of an orderly
society that required his imprisonment insists only that he
be privile ged to worship God to the extent that hi s conduct
in prison permits." (emphasis added) Thus , it seems clear
that a prisoner's right to indulge his r e ligious belief is , at
best, r e lative to the circumstances surrounding his im prisonment.
Despite a general and continuing adhesion to the doctrine of non-interference with prison admini strative procedures , rece nt cases reflect a current, albeit limited,
tendency of some courts to open up new avenues of redress
to prisoners claiming infringement of their religious beliefs. In each case the petitioners have been m e mbe r s of
the Black Muslim sect , c l aiming allegiance to the tenets of
Islam as promulgated by E lijah Muhammad. Analysis reveals certain distinguishable factors among these cases ,
notably in the selection of remedies upon which the action
is founded. Remedies range from habeas corpus proceedings and actions under the civil rights statutes of 1871 to
actions "in the nature of m andamus". But there is a strikingly sim ilar pattern in the construction of the prisoners'
compl aint s.
The recent case of Walker v . Blackwell is illustrative
of the various allegations which s uch petitions usually contain. The inm ates, confine d in the United State s Peniten tiary at Atlanta , Georgia, allege d that they had been harr assed and denie d the right to worship and practice their

religion to the same extent as other prisoners of different
faiths. They further asked that the warden be e njoined
from denying them, "the right to pr actice the religion as
taught by Elijah Muhammad, to wear a religious medal or
ring, to receive literature , to correspond with Elijah Muhammad or his ministers, to listen to Muhammad's radio
program, to observe the dietary laws of the Islamic r eli gion, to be furnished with a time and a place in the peni tentiary to worship , to receive Elij ah Muhamm ad or his
ministers to conduct services in the penitentiary, and to
. be furnished copies of the 'Holy Quran' ." As any exam ination of Black Muslim litigation will show, the above complaint covers, with one exception , the st andard series of
allegations upon which these actions are predicated . A
District of Columbia decision, Fulwood v. Clemm er, r e veals the additional type of complaint , not contained in
Walker. In this case, and in num erous others , the prisoner contended that he had been subjected to direct , phys ical disciplinary controls , i .e . solitary confine ment and
detention in a special treatment unit for two years, solely
on a basis of his religious be liefs. While upholding the au. thority of prison officials to take disciplinary measures in
light of inflamatory remarks made by the prisoner, the
cou rt found that the punishment was not only out of proportion to the offense committed , but furthe r he ld that it was
imposed for "the purpose of suppressing . . . t he Muslim
religion in prison. "

The Muslim Complaint
Before turning to a brief discussion of the results of
such litigation, m ention must be made of one othe r factor
which is of cruci al importance to any s tudy of Black Mus lim dem ands. The clandestine aspects of the Brotherhootl,
the strong a uthoritarian control exercised by its leaderJs,
their arrogant, often hostile attitude in dealing with prison
a uthorities , and particularly its tenets dictating ultra - militant Black Suprem acy, have all ope rated to create strong
judicial suspicion of the movement's c laim to be "religious"
in fact as well as in n am e .
Some courts, highly suspicious of Muslim activities
from the first and faced with prior determinations by penal
authoritie s which they are reluctant to overturn , have been
quick to distinguish between freedom of be lief an d the right
to exe rcise those belie fs. Note the l anguage of In Re Fer guson: "Even as prisoners , petitioners have the absolute
right to possess their Muslim beliefs . . . but assembling
and discussing the inflam atory Muslim doctrines in a pri son
situation must be considered to be such action , even though
' religious,' whic h m ay be r easonably regulate d . .. " In
t hese instances, the courts, while ducking the issue of what
i s and what is not religion , have cle arly m a rked the way
for application of those restraints on Muslim activities
necessary to maintain prison order and discipline.
It should be note d , however, that no courts have he l d
the Muslim Brotherhood to be totally devoid of all r eligious
content. When pressed for a determination of this issue,
they r eact in eithe r of two ways: In line with those decisions exemplifie d by Ferguson , where the r e ligious ele ment
is admitted but the r e straints are justified, or by t a king a
stance in defense of the movement's religious content. P e rh aps the Fulwood decision, with the court flatly upholding
the Muslim faith as a relig ion, is the best example of this
approach.
It would seem , then , that the admittedly unorthodox,
and often disagreeable, tenet s of the Muslim Brothe r hood
will not be a llowed to impede judicial review of those rights
asserted unde r the protection of religious fre edom. On the
other h and, neither will they be particularly helpfulin persuading courts that the regulations pl aced upon their free
exerci se ar e unreasonable.
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What have been the results of this litigation? On the
face of the decisions, it is clear that generally the courts
have been unwilling to grant the affirmative relief requested. The exception, as indicated previously, has occurred
when the court is confronted with strong evidence of undue
physical mistreatment of inmates coupled with a clear
showing that is was the result of biased treatment reflecting a prejudice against the petitioner's religious beliefs ,
or that the sanctions imposed were out of proportion to the
offense committed. The important consideration, however,
is that the courts have displayed an increasing tendencyto
allow all the petitioners a hearing on the merits. It is this
element that may herald a substantial reversal in the courts'
treatment of inmate complaints, whatever their source.
Again, I am not concerned primarily with the specific
demands which the Muslims have made. I think that it is
safe to assume that most of this litigation has been prompted by the Muslim hierarchy outside the prison walls as a
supplemental means of implementing their Black Supremacy
movement. No doubt it is , and will continue to be , useful
in promoting those ends. On the other hand, there is the
occasional case where the complaints are justified on the
merits. Our prisons and the men who administer them are
certainly subject to the same bias and resulting inequities
as is the society which they serve. But I believe that it is
an equally valid assumption that these decisions will not be
limited in application to the Black Muslims. This group,
vocal though it may be , represents only a tiny fraction of
our overall prison population. It is apparent that the import of the Black Muslim decisions may be considerable
indeed. Whether or not the courts will allow an extension
of the above cases, as precedent for reviewing other inmate
compl aints, is entirely conjectural at the present.

Role of Civil Rights
Although this article does not directly concern the current civil rights movement sweeping the United states, nor
is the movement referred to in any of the cases, it would
be unreasonable to assume that it exerts no influence in the
area spanned by this litigation. Beginning with the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education , even the most casual observer must note the trend of judicial concern for minority
rights, in whatever form they are asserted. In the Muslim
prisoner litigation, the question left unanswered is simply
that of with which minority are the courts concerned, the
petitioners as Black Muslims or the petitioners as prison
inmates . The question evokes an almost wholly subjective
response and a definite answer will probably be a long time
in coming. But given the increasingly militant tone of civil
rights activism, cases of the sort presented here are certain to increase, both in number and in scope. This cannot
help but prod the courts into a more definitive position on
the rights and privileges of everyone committed to lawful
incarceration.
In the meantime, these cases indicate that the courts
are slowly coming to grips with the older doctrine of noninterference with prison administration and disciplinary
control of inmates. To those who claim that this will undercut the ability of prison officials to perform the functions assigned to them by the state , the answer seems clear.
In this age of enlightened penology and greater awareness
of individual rights , what damage can be done by seeking
to inject, where absent, an element of "reasonableness"
and responsibility in the manner in which public officials
perform their duties?

---*----

COMMAND INFLUENCE AND
MILITARY JUSTICE
Bernard J. Casey

The possibility that an American serviceman could be
tried for a criminal offense before a court that has been
influenced by the directives or desires of a superior officer
is a danger that threatens our most basic concepts of justice. Moreover, the possibility that a military defense
counsel might be hampered in the performance of his judicial duties because of fear that he will receive a low efficiency rating is likewise a serious threat to the integrity
of our present court-martial system. Both of these possibilities exist under the present structure of the military
judiciary .

Court Martial Justice?
In examining the impact of command influence on military justice it is first necessary to understand the basic
structure of the military judicial system. The military
tribunal which tries criminal offenses is the court-martial.
The court-martial derives its authority from Congress'
power to " ••. make Rules for the Government and Regulations of the land and naval forces ••. " (Art. I, Sec. 8,
U. S, Constitution) . It is an ad hoc tribunal which is created

on the order of a commander authorized to create it (the
"convening authority"). It acts only on one or more cases
specifically referred to it and is thereafter permanently
adjourned.
Military justice is structured on three levels of courtmartial. The General Court-Martial has jurisdiction to try
all persons and offenses subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and can adjudge any sentence, including
death. The proceedings are largely controlled by the Law
Officer, the trial counsel and the defense counsel must be
qualified attorneys at law.
The Special Court-Martial has jurisdiction to try all
persons subject to the Code and all offenses of a non-capital nature, with the exception of the Army . Itis limited to
adjudging sentences of a maximum of six months confinement, plus a bad conduct discharge. Army Special Courts
are not empowered to adjudge bad conduct discharges.
There is no provision for a Law Officer, nor is there a
provision for the appointment of a legally qualified defense
counsel unless the trial counsel is so qualified.
The Summary Court-Martial is empowered to try only
enlisted men and is limited to adjudging sentences not in
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excess of one month's confinement. The proceedings are
conducted by any commanding officer within the accused's
chain of command. There is no provision for the appointment of a Law Officer or for the appointment of counsel.
All court-martials are automatically reviewed for legal sufficiency by the Judge Advocate' s office and are then
forwarded to the convening authority who has the discretionary power to suspend the sentence in whole or in part.
Certain convictions are automatically reviewed by the
Boards of Review and by the Court of Military Appeals.
Other convictions may be appealed to these agencies. (For
a thorough treatment of the application of constitutional
safeguards to military justice see Right to Counsel and
the Serviceman, XV Catholic University Law Review, 203).
Under the Code, the court-martial is an independent
court of law. Although the commanding officer retains ultimate responsibility for discipline within his command,
the court-martial is not his instrument for achieving that
discipline . The Code provides:
No authority convening a ... court-martial, nor
any other commanding officer shall censure, reprimand or admonish such court ... with respect
to .•. any ....exercise of its functions . . . No
person subject to this Code shall attempt to coerce
or, by any unauthorized means, influence the actions of a court-martial . . . in reaching the findings or sentence in any case ... " (Art. 37, UCMJ;
10 u. s. c. 837).

such apparent influence led to the reversal of a conviction
in United states v. Schultz, 8USCMA129, 23 CMR 353 (1957).
In that case, after the sentence had been arinounced, the
president of the court submitted a statement that the court
felt the sentence was in keeping with a Navy policy directive
relating to offenses involving moral turpitude. Third, convictions will be reversed when the court finds that the prosecution has injected command policy into trials. United
States v. Lackey 8 USCMA 718, 25 CMR 222 (1958) , illustrates this principle. There the trial counsel, in arguing
on sentence, stated that it was undoubtedly the thought of
the convening authority that the accused should be separated
from the service with a punitive discharge.
The Court does , however, recognize the need for statements of discipline policies. Unless it finds a sufficiently
close nexus between the statement and the particular courtmartial it will not reverse a conviction on the grounds of
command influence. United States v. Carter 9USCMA108,
25 CMR 370, (1958), where the Commander in Chief of the
United states Army in Europe stated at a commanders'
conference that steps must be taken to improve discipline
and to foster better German -American relations. The
Court did not find a close enough connection between the
directive and the particular case tried to warrant a finding
of undl!e influence.

Theoretically a commander charged with attempting to
influence the personnel of a court-martial may be criminally prosecuted for a violation of the UCMJ Article 98.
However, there are no reported cases of conviction for the
exercise of undue influence . Rather, this issue is attacked
collaterally as a matter of prejudicial error in trials affected thereby.
Blatant attempts to exert undue influence on courtsmartial personnel are, of course, readily perceived. However, because of its traditions of obedience and its needs
for rigid disciplinary policies, the military, as opposed to
the civilian community, is faced with a grave danger that
the defendant may be convicted by a tribunal which has been
affected by a subtle and even by an unintended exertion of
command influence. Such a danger is, in my opinion , one
of the most fundamental threats to the integrity of courtmartial and, unless scrupulously guarded against , will seriously undermine public confidence in our system of milit ary justice.

Danger of Pol icy Directives
The subtle influence of which I speak can be detected
in various situations. The first concerns the "Policy"
statements or directives of the commander concerning good
order and discipline. Such pronouncements are universally
accepted as an essential part of the military setting. However, once this "policy" begins to impinge on the independence of a court-martial the cause of justice has been s er iously compromise d. The Court of Military Appeals has
found that such policy statements or directives constitute
undue command influence in several situations: First,
where the commander aims his influence at the officers
selected for the court, as in United States v. Hawthorne,
7 USCMA 293, 22CMR 83, (1956). In that case, some time
prior to the trial of an accused, the Commanding General
of the Fourth Army issued a policy directive on eliminating
Regular Army personnel who were r epeat offenders. The
directive also stated that its provisions were to be brought
to the attention of every member of every General courtmartial to be thereafter appointed. Second, undue command
influence has been found where it is apparent that the court
has been influenced by policy directives. An example of

A second problem area concerns "orientation" lectures
given to court members for the purpose of explaining various legal problems and instructing them on their judicial
dutie s. These lecture s are s anctioned by the Manual for
Courts-Martial (paragraph 38) and are often quite beneficial. Yet the possibility that these instructions could be
interpreted as sinister methods of conveying command policy demands that extreme caution be used in their prepara tion and delivery.

The Albert Case
In a 1966 case (United States v. Albert, 16USCMA111 ,
36 CMR 267), the defendant contended that he was deprived
of a fair trial and a fair review because of command influence. The contention was based on a lecture given by
the staff Judge Advocate at Fort Devens, Massachusetts,
to officers at the Post, some of whom were members of
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the court-martial which later tried the appellant. The primary purpose of the lecture was to define the duties and
responsibilities of the members of courts-martial. During
the course of the lecture the Staff Judge Advocate undertook to explain the administrative, morale and disciplinary
problems arising from certain combinations of punishments. The lecture did, however, emphasize that the determination of appropriate sentences was for the court alone, and that these remarks were not to be interpreted as
a statement of command policy.
The majority of the Court construed the remarks on
sentencing as a plea for careful consideration of all the
factors that determine the appropriateness of the sentence,
rather than as a direction to include, at all times and under
all circumstances, certain combinations. The conviction
was therefore affirmed.
In a vigorous dissent , Judge Ferguson wrote that despite the expressed disclaimers of the Staff Judge Advocate ,
the only logical inference of these lectures is to dictate to
the members the need to adopt only those combinations of
punishments that will obviate the problems.
Recognizing that the lines of propriety are not very
clear, the Army and Navy have ordered the cessation of
all pre -trial orientation lectures. The extent to which they
remain permissible in the other services has been limited
to general orientation on the operation of court-martial
procedures and the responsibilities of court members.
Court members are not the only ones exposed to the
contamination of command influence. As to personnel other
than court members, the Code provides: "No (convening
authority) . . . or other commanding officer, shall censure,
re prim and, or admonish . . . any . . . law officer, or counsel . . . with respect to any . •. exercise of . . . his functions
in the conduct or the proceedings." (UCMJ, Article 37).

Duties of Officer Counsel
The sensitive duties of a Law Officer require the utmost insulation from the possibilities of command influence. The Army, through its Field Judiciary Program,
has at least minimized, if not entirely eliminated the possibilities of such a problem. Only the most highly qualified
judge advocates are assigned to this program. It provides
for the separation of the Law Officer into a specialized
division under the direct command of the Judge Advocate
General. Its objective is to separate the Law Officer from
the normal c hain of command, and free him from the supervision of any convening authority or staff judge advocate,
thus affording him the independence that his job requires.
The defense counsel is likewise in a most sensitive
position, Yet , under the present system he is not afforded
the protection that his duties demand. As a member of the
normal chain of command the defense counsel works under
the direct supervision of the staff judge advocate who, in
turn, is directly responsible to the convening a uthority and
is dependent upon him for a good efficiency report. The
situations where the defense counsel's loyalty to his com manding officer could conflict with his duties to his client
are numerous. Let us consider, for example, the case
where a man is being charged with wilfully disobeying the
"lawful order" of the convening authority. The defense
contends first that the order was not properly communicated and secondly that it was not a "lawful" order-- both
valid defenses. As to the first defense, the accused, Private Alpha, must contend that Major General Bravo did not
order him to cease fraternizing with certain young ladies
in the local community, a contention which may best be
supported by impeaching the General's testimony. In presenting the second contention the defense counsel must, in
effect, tell the General that he had no business issuing such
an order in the first place. The possible conflicts of interest are manifest, and become even more so if the de-

fense counsel is a career minded soldier. In these situations the accused's right to a thorough and vigorous defense
is obviously not adequately guaranteed by the provisions of
the Code.

Legislation as a Possible Remedy
Thus the threat that command influence poses to military justice is most likely to be found in either of two situations in the pronouncements of command policy on disiplin:e, or in the pre-trial orientation lectures given by staff
officers. We have also seen that while the Army and Navy
have banned the pre-trial l ectures, the other services have
not done so. It is apparent than that this problem presents
a very definite threat to the integrity of the court-martial
system. It is likewise apparent that the Uniform Code or
Military Justice does not adequately meet the problem.
Recognizing this fact, Senator Ervin , Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, has introduced
legislation (S-749 , 89th Cong.)tp broaden the scope of Article 37, UCMJ. This bill would prohibit not only the convening authority of commanding officers but also members
of their staff from censoring or reprimanding any court
personnel, including counsel. Any sort of pre-trial lectures
to members of courts-martial now authorized by paragraph
38 of the Manual for Courts-Martial would be prohibited.
The bill also provides that the evaluation of a person's performance as a court member would not be the basis for the
rating he receives on an effe~tiveness or fitness report
used for purposes of promotion or assignment. Similarly,
provisions are made to avoid the indirect efforts to inhibit
defense counsel by stipulating that in the preparation of his
fitness report for promotion or assignment no person is
free to prepare a less favorable report than would otherwise be the case because of the vigor and ze al with which
he performed his duties as defense counsel.
My own observations lead me to believe thatthe injustices of command influence are not at all wide spread. Yet
the dange r that they could become so has not been adequately extinguished by statute . It is for this r eason that legislation like S-749, although difficult to enforce, must be enacted into l aw. Otherwise the serviceman's right to an
impartial trial, guarant eed to civilians by the Constitution,
will be left without a statutory basis and will remain in a
state of jeopardy.
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STUDENTS SUPPLEMENT POVERTY PROGRAM

Less than a year ago four students and a professor
from the Catholic University Law School formed a committee to study possible ways in which law students might
make a significant contribution to some area of the law .
They were particularly interested in the impact oflaw upon
poverty.
Today the Catholic University Law School has a student-sponsored legal aid program which provides nearly
twenty volunteers to the Neighborhood Legal Services Program in Washington, D. C .
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a self-help project. The committee found a receptive audience for their idea in Julian Dugas, director of the Washington, D. C . NLSP, and his deputy Lorenzo Jacobs, and
other NLSP officials. In June, Dugas and Jacobs met with
Father Broderick, Hansing , and C. U. student Bar Association President John Miles to discuss various ways in which
an independent student program could cooperate with the
NLSP in its neighborhood work. Hansing drew up a proposed format over the summer . At the end of the school
year Miles appointed third_year student Bill Clendenen as
student director of the program. Clendenen had been active
the previous year in the law school's legal assistance pro gram, in which students assisted lawyers who had been
assigned indigent cases. Clendenen consulted at length
with Jacobs over the course the program would take . At
this point, Clendenen became the moving force behind the
program. Before the school year began he had visited all
the neighborhood offices to determine the need for students
and to familiarize himself with the problems the NLSP faced
at these stations. He and Jacobs modified the program
blueprint to fit the conditions which they faced, in terms of
the workload students could assume, conditions at the var ious offices , and a host of other problems that arose dur ing the initial stages.

Enthusiastic Response

The volunteers assist lawyers at the ten NLSP neighborhood offices in the District of Columbia. These offices
are located in areas where the poverty concentr ation is
greatest. students are able to assist in virtually all legal
work which does not require a member of the Bar. They
work ten to fifteen hours per week at the offices without
pay or academic credit. The program is adm inistered by
a student director.
The program had its beginnings in several months of
study , research, and promotional work by the original student-faculty committee . The initial prime mover on behalf
of the students was James Hansing, now a third year night
student. Hansing and Father Albert J. Broderick, 0. P .,
the faculty advisor to the present program, considered
several alternatives for a student work pr oject, with an eye
toward a private foundation grant. Dave Stapleton and Pat
Gallagher, presently third year day students , and second
year student Hugh De Fazio, also worked on the committee,
which ambitiously called itself the Foundation Committee.
Eventually the committee put aside the idea of obtaining
a foundation grant and concentrated on finding the means for

When classes began Clendenen conducted a vigorous
recruiting campaign among the students of the second and
third year classes. He had about two applications for each
of the twenty available openings. In view of the sacrifices
required of volunteers who would be working without pay,
the response was overwhelming.
The program has continued to operate at nearly full
strength, and it appears that the law school will have little
difficulty in honoring a commitment to provide approxi mately twenty volunteers for the ten stations.
The faculty of the law school has recently approved of
a two -credit seminar course de aling with the legal problems of the poor. The course will be open to a limited
number of second and third year students , and preference
will be gi ven to field workers in the program. An important
function of the course will be to serve as a complement to
the field work of volunteers in the program. It is intended
to give interested students a broad view of legal problems
as they r e late to the social conditions of Americans who
live in poverty.
The entire program is intended to be one of mutual
benefit to the comm unity, the students, and the school. The
law students providing invaluable assistance to the hardpressed NLSP lawyers in their day to day efforts to pro vide legal service to the poor. At the same time the students are acquiring an education in one of the most urgent
problems confronting the legal profession , that of unhappy
relationship between the poor of the country and the law.
The legal skills they acquire in this work are important.
But this factor is secondary both to the educational value
of the program, and to the fact that participating students
are deve loping habits of the highest form of professional
responsibility.

- - - * -- -
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TEAM RETURNS TO NEW YORK

For the third consecutive year the Catholic University national moot court team
has swept the Washington area regionals ,
this year defeating Howard Law School in
the climatic final round . Howard had defeated perennial powerhouse Georgetown
t he previous week .
The moot court team , composed of vet erans JohnWefingandBillCusickand second year competitor Jim Mundy , argues
this week in New York City in the national
moot court finals . The C. U. team has
fared well in two nationals in the past two
years , advancing each time to the semifinals before losing to the 1964 and 1965
national champions Ohio State and Texas .
One of the lighter moments in the 1966 Moot Court Team's prac ti ce
sessions. John Wefing speaking w ithout notes, makes o po int too
blue-ribbon panel of judges. From left to right : De on Miller, Prof .
Joseph English , and team coach William J . Brown, Jim Mund y (I.)
and Bill Cusick, seated at the counsel' s tabl e, lend their moral suppo rt
to Wefing.

Last year John Wefing and Dick Wood ard , who is now on the faculty at UCLA
law school , handled .the oral argument.
Woodard previously had argued on the 1964
team with classmate Jim Hunte r, editor of
the 1965 - 66 C . U. Law Review .
A perfectionist tradition of intensive
practice has perhaps been the largest fac tor in the Catholic University's recent moot
court success .
Professor William J . Brown, the team
coach this year and last , and law school
alumni Mr . & Mrs. Paul Malloy have been
instrumental in this aspect of the team's
success . The Malloys are national moot
court vete r ans . Mrs . Malloy was a mem ber of the 1964 team which went to the
nationals .
This year's team suffered the handicap
of drawing a bye in the first round of the
regionals . It had argued only one round
when it faced the polished Howard team in
the finals .
But Cusick matched his fine performance of the previous week's argument against Maryland, and Wefing was superb,
winning the best speaker's cup. The team's
strong showing raised hopes that last
year's record could be matched or exceeded .

Lost year's notionally ranked Catholic University moot court team makes
final preparations before one of the New York arguments . Left to right
ore Dick Woodard, coach Wil I iom J . Brow n, John Wefing , a nd Bil I
Cusick ,
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DIGNITARIES ATTEND LEAHY DEDICATION
September 1966 marked the return of the Columbus
School of Law to the campus of Catholic University. The
dedication of Leahy Hall, the new law school building,
marked the formal recognition of this return on the weekend of November 11th and 12th. The University's annual
Alumni Homecoming provided the backdrop for the dedication of the spacious new home of the law school.
On Friday evening the weekend's events started with
a cocktail party in the Delaware Room of the Sheraton Park
Hotel. Faculty and students of the law school were joined
in this convivial celebration by returning alumni, delegates
from fifty of the nation's law schools, members of the University and friends of the school.

Upon arriving at Caldwell Hall Bishop McDonald extended the greetings of the University. "A true university
can only be complete," he said, "when it has a fine law
school." "A fine law school," noted the Rector, "in the
case of Catholic University, has been in existence, but
Leahy Hall will provide expanded facilities for the established excellence of the law schoolto continue." The Rector then introduced Quentin Ertel, a third year student, who
surprised Dean Miller by presenting to him a wall clock
for his office as a "slight measure of the students' appreciation for his many efforts and contributions to them individually and to the law school as a whole."
Dean Miller said in his acceptance of the momento that
"I'll have to wait totellthesefellowswhatthisreallymeans
to me." In continuing his remarks the Dean noted a "real
pride" in the law school professors as they explore and
express to the students the "real mystery of the law." "The
law school," Dean Miller said, "offers much to the community," and, he called on all present "to be witness to his
pledge to plan for the future."

Legal Community Extends Congratulations

This portrait of the late William H. Leahy, after whom the new law
school building is name d , was presented by Bishop Wi lliam J. McDonald
Rector of the Univers ity, and Mrs. Leahy.

Saturday morning, the Rector of Catholic University,
the Most Reverend William J. McDonald, blessed Leahy
Hall. The building is named in honor of the late William
Leahy, a prominent District of Columbia attorney, who was
pre sident of the Columbus School of Law at the time that
law school merged with the Catholic University Law School
in 1954. Leahy Hall contains every facility crucial to the
function of a law school. The Alioto Library named in hon or of Joseph Alioto, an alumnus of Columbus School of Law
and a prominent anti-trust attorney in the San Francisco
area, provides spacious facilities for present and future
enrollment. The Guarnieri Moot Court Room was named
in honor of Lewis Guarnieri, Treasurer of Catholic University, a leading member of the Ohio Bar and an interested
alumnus of the Columbus School of Law. It provides for
the students realistic setting for the development of their
courtroom skills. Classrooms, administrative offices, student offices, conference rooms, and lounges are also found
in this well complemented structure .
Membe.rs of the fac ulty were joined by delegates from
fifty law schools , members of the Bar and officials of the
University in the procession which went from Leahy Hall
to Caldwell· Hall, following the blessing of the law school.

Sidney S. Sachs, President of the District of Columbia
Bar Association congratulated the law school .on its new
building. "The law is marked with a current of idealism,"
stated Mr. Sachs. "A law school embodies the teaching
element of this profession and is ahumanedificededicated
to the young idealist who is aspiring toward the learning of
law."
The advisor to the Section of Legal Education of the
American Bar Association, John G. Hervey, spoke on behalf of the Association. "The role of the law school is vital
in the distinctive task of creation. A task for which Catholic University's Columbus School of Law is well equipped
to handle."
Myers S. McDougal, of the Yale Law School, and one
of the world's foremost authorities on the role of law in
the structure of society, gave special mention to the abilities of Dean Miller, his predecessor in the office of the
Presidency of the Association of American Law Schools .
Professor McDougal stated that " . . . present today is a
representation of the finest of law school members of the
legal profession in America."
"The best of any law school spirit," emphasized McDougal, "is contained in the will and understanding of the
faculty."
With the conclusion of the morning program the audience was invited to attend the Rector's brunch , a buffet
held in the Women's Dining Hall.
The evening dedication and homecoming banquet, held
in the Park Ballroom of the Sheraton, culminated the weekends events. John Mc Giver, national theater, cinema, and
television personality, and a Catholic University alumnus,
served as master of ceremonies. The keynote speaker was
Chief Justice Warren of the Supreme Court of the United
states .
Chief Justice Warren heralded the return of the law
school to the campus as an opportunity to participate in the
"university's community and to play its rightful part in the
varied scholarly associations available in campus life."
The Chief Justice emphasized the valuable asset a law
school in the nation's capital has just by reason of its location. He urged that the student avail himself of all the
surrounding opportunities. In acknowledging the debt owed
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to the past, the Chief Justice stated that the search in the
study of law was that for lasting peace for mankind, This
search is guided by "Pacem in Terris ," Pope John XXIII
encyclical. The Chief Justice in closing said , "But as we
dedicate your new law school building , I can think of no
worthier commitment for those of you who are teachers
at the Catholic University School of Law and those of you

who are priviledged to be their students than to pledge yourselve s to fulfilling as best you can the great promise which
this document holds for mankind. !m ake these remarks to
you in no parochial sense. Pacem in T err i s belongs to us
all, regardless of individual religion or creed . It was ad dressed to men of good will , and to men of good will throughout the world it belongs."

Third year stude nts Que ntin Erte l and Stan Sa moraj czyk present Deon
Mill er w ith a wall c lock memento o n be half of the students, in appreciation
for his service to the law students. Dean Mil ler's contribution to lega l
education far beyond the range of the law school we re cited by Professor
Myers McDougal of Yale.

Law Review e dito r Kevin Booth (left) and SBA preside nt J ohn Mi le s,
greet Chief Justice Earl Warren on the night of the al umni banquet.
Wa rre n de live red hi s law school dedication address on this occasion .

- - ---ti - - -

WARREN LAUDS PACEM AS SEMINAL
In his law school de dication speech Chief J ustice E arl
Warren named Pacem in Terris, the landm a rk encyclic al
of Pope John XXIII, as a "se minal doc um ent" in the se ar ch
for wor ld order through law . The Chief J ustice reviewed
at length the historical progr ess of the great documents
which form the basis of the l aw that we know today. He
emphasized the fact that a system of law has existe d in all
civilizations and that it could truly be the very force that
creates civilization. "Law is the basic ingr edient of civilization." It is the foundation - the ve ry bedrock on which
all of the advance s of m ankind have been based ... Law
is part of the ve ry fibe r of m ankind; it is part of the instinctive nat ure of all of us, and without it progress is be yond attainm ent."
Warren ch arted the course of de velopment of law in
weste rn civiliz ation , and in our time, efforts to begin the
construction of a viable legal orde r . He noted the unive r sal implic ations of docume nts that had been written for a
spe cific situation , such as the Magna C art a and the Decla ration of Inde pendence .
"Pacem in Terri s," he stre ssed,"has c l aimed a place
among those documents which state truths that have validity for all men at all times." Its r e levance in our age is to
the necessity of achieving a wor ld pe ace , a s e arch , he noted,
which has not yet been successful.
The Chief J ustice fo und in P acem in T e r r i s vital explan ation s for this failure and the pr oper me ans fo r corr ecting it.

"Pacem in Te rri s ," stressed Justice Warren is ad dress e d "to all m e n of good will" m aking it a non-pa roc hial
doc ument be lon ging to all. Its m e ssage was that r ace an d
religion s hould be no bar to each man's unique ne ss , and
that the individual man's hum an rights under the moral l aw
and the com mon good are "'universal, inviolable and in alienable .'" The right s of the minority gro ups must be
valued, r e specte d and not viol ated.
The 'Chief Justice advocated following the m e ssage of
P ac em in T e rris for those engaged in l aw, and not t o look
back but to str ive t o ameliorat e wrongs by pre paring and
doing for the future . He advocate d gr eater libe r ality in the
field of human civil rights while conforming with prese nt
nee ds for orde r in socie ty. He stre sse d the nee d for more
legislation in this field. Today's wants must be corrected
by those pe rsons t r aine d for this t a sk, specific ally membe rs of the Legal Profe ssion. "But as we de dicate your
new law s chool building , I can think of no wor thier com m itm ent for those of you who ar e teachers and those of you
who are privileged to be t heir stude nts than to ple dge your s e lves to fulfilling as best yo u can the great promise which
this doc ument holds for mankind. I make the se remarks to
you in no parochial s e nse . Pacem in Terris belongs to us
all , re gardless of individual r e ligion or creed. It was address e d to m en of good will, and to m en of good will throughout the world it be longs."

- - ---(;(---
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OLD TO THE NEW
Joseph F. Donohue, Jr.
In September of 1954 the School of Law of the . Catholic
University of America, which had merged with the Columbus
Law School two months ear lier, established its residence
at 1323 18th Street, N. W ., Washington, D. C. The building
selected for the law school was not without historical and
political significance even before any law had been taught
within its walls. It had been the home of John Foster Dulles,
former Secretary of State , and himself a law school graduate and noted international lawyer.

Perhaps the most prominent and most useful facility
is the library, which comprises a part of each of the three
floors of the building and has the capacity to hold 125,000
volumes on its open shelves. In addition it provides a reading and study area for approximately 250 students.
The mahogany panelled moot court room is realistic
and professional in appearance and will prove a valuable
asset in enabling students to practice and appreciate courtroom technique. This year's moot court program has been
expanded to include not only the usual intramural compe tition for first year students and the Sutherland Cup competition but also a trial moot court competition. The new
courtroom will be instrumental in implementing these pro grams. Located on the first floor the courtroom seats approximately seventy spectators.

THE OLD- This is an ancient shot of the law school library in the days
whe n the low school was in McMahon Hall on c ampus.

The student enrollment that first September consisted
of 116 students (39 day; 77 night), which was not overwhelming for a faculty numbering six full time and ten part time
professors. The facilities, though not the most modern,
were certainly adequate. The library shelved 23,500 vol umes and the four former bedrooms afforded ample classroom space for the number of students then in the school.
The fact that the school was a former home inspired a
homelike atmosphere, providing both students and faculty
with the opportunity to casually discuss the legal principles
which were being taught in class. The informal atmosphere
existing inside was offset by the professional, political and
business milieu which characterizes so much of downtown
Washington.
In time, the quality and merits of the law school were
reflected in an increased student enrollment and an expanding faculty, with the result that the facilities on 18th Street
were soon rendered inadequate. It was apparent that if the
law school was to continue to make progress it would have
to move to a location which would accommodate its pressing needs.
On September twelfth of this year registration was held
in the new law school building on the Catholic University
campus in N. E. Washington. While the new building lacked
the historical tradition of the former law school, the accommodations and facilities afford the law student the op portunity to realize the utmost in curricular and extracur ricular activities . The $1,000,000 air conditioned building
can easily accommodate the present enrollment of 414 students (229 full time) and if necessary it can be expanded to
facilitate more . In addition to its five classrooms and two
seminar rooms the building has facilities which are indispensable, both for studying law and for providing related
student activities.

THE NEW- This is one corner of the main floor of the spacious new law
school library, which was built to accomodate an enrollment of 600. The
library inc ludes three levels, with the upper and lower levels built to
ensure maximum privacy for study .

The ground floor of the building , besides having two
classrooms, is equipped with offices and facilities for the
various student activities, manyofwhich have also expand ed in keeping with the progress set by the law school in
general. The accommodations include offices for the Law
Review, the Student Bar Association, the Moot Court Board ,
the Legal Issue, Legal Services and a student lounge. The
improved facilities will enable these organizations to accomplish more for themselves and more for the entire law
school.
The top floor of the building houses administration and
faculty offices, secretarial quarters, conference rooms,
and a faculty lounge. The marked need for the increase in
secretarial facilities is a natural consequence of the overall growth of the law school and the resulting demands of
the administration and faculty in keeping up with this ex pansion.
The new law school building is indeed to young to have
the historical significance or the tradition of the former
building. It does have, however, facilities and advantages
from which each student can greatly benefit. From these
benefits all who study here will have the opportunity to give
something back to the law school which may in time be
meaningful. Certainly the professional spirit which was
planted in the old school will grow in the new one. But if
the building itself is ever to become historically significant
it will be as a result of a legacy left by those who once
studied and taught within its walls.
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